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Abstract
 Deregulation and progress in information and communication technologies have 
increased  the  geographical  expansion  of  banking  structures  and  instruments.  This  makes 
banks operationally close to the borrowers. At the same time, banking industry consolidation 
have  induced  a  geographical  concentration  of  banking  decision  centers  and  strategic 
functions, leading to an increase of the functional distance that separates the decision center 
of a bank from its operational branches. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of 
these two trends on SME lending. Our findings on French data show that increased functional 
distance and operational proximity are positively associated with the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity,  considered  as  a  measure  of  financing  constraints.  These  adverse  effects  are 
particularly acute for small firms.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last decade in France, all categories of credit institutions have known a substantial 
decrease of the number of their establishments. This decrease was about 22% for commercial 
banks whose number decline from 386 in 1997 (including 199 French banks and 187 foreign 
banks) to 290 in 2008 (including 135 French banks and 155 foreign banks).  It was about 36% 
for mutual and cooperative banks whose number decline from 161 in 1997 to 103 in 2008 (see 
Appendix1, Figure 1) 
This fall of the number of bank’s institutions have been following a longstanding trend. 
Thus, since the law bank of January 24, 1984, the French Banking sector have been engaged 
in an intense movement of restructuring, which resulted in a steady decrease of the number of 
credit institutions (see Appendix 1, Figure 1). The number of credit institutions established in 
France (excluding Monaco) has declined from 2001 in 1984 to 722 in 2008 (-64%) and during 
the last ten years, their number has decreased of about 40% (1209 in 1998) 
The dynamic movement of reorganization and renovation of banking structures has been 
accompanied  by  a  strengthening,  since  the  early  2000s,  of  the  banking  system’s  supply. 
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  Figure 2 (see Appendix 1) shows that the number of branches, which was maintained during 
fifteen years in a range of 25500 to 26000, is in progress since 2000 (27893 at the end of 2008 
excluding branches  of the postal  bank). Also,  the number of Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), which exceeds that of branches since 1997, almost doubled over the last ten years 
(51690  in  2008,  against  29407  in  1998).  Finally,  the  information  and  communication 
technology  progress  favored  the  expansion  of  impersonal  methods  to  conduct  businesses, 
such  as  Internet-banking,  home-banking,  or  phone-banking.  These  changes  reflect  both  a 
research of productivity gains among French credit institutions and a strong dynamism and 
also a deep technological change in distribution channels. 
Both of these phenomena have a spatial dimension. The geographical diffusion of banking 
structures and instruments due to technological progress contributed to the ease of access to 
banking  services  by  savers  and  borrowers  established  locally.  It  refers  to  the  so  called 
“operational distance” considered in the banking literature. It largely depends on the physical 
distance that separates banks from their clientele. With respect to organizational structure, the 
wave of mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number of banks and have created 
large  national  and  multinational  bank  holding  companies,  have  induced  a  geographical 
concentration of banking decision centers and strategic functions, leading to an increase in the 
“functional  distance”
1  that  separates  the  decision  center  of  a  bank  from  its  operational 
branches. 
In this paper, we focus on the French banking industry in order to assess the effects of 
these contrasting trends of spatial diffusion-concentration on financing constraints for local 
SMEs. 
A large literature is devoted to assessing the impact of banking consolidation on local 
development. The vast majority of these studies follow a bank-based approach where they 
compare the lending behavior of small banks, theoretically considered as best suited to deliver 
relationship lending and therefore considered “close” to the need of local SMEs, with the 
lending  behavior  of  large  banks,  considered  as  more  “distant”.  They  find  differences  in 
relationship lending with larger institutions tending to lend to older and larger SMEs with 
stronger financial statements (Haynes et al. 1999; Cole et al. 2004; Scott 2004; Berger et al. 
2005). There is also evidence that as lending decisions are made higher in the organizational 
structure there is less emphasis on soft information penalizing small opaque firms (Liberti and 
Mian 2009).  
A few other studies follow a market based approach, where the analysis is carried out at 
the local market level (Avery and Samolyk 2000; Berger et al. 2007; Bonaccorsi and Gobbi 
2001; Collender and Shaffer 2003). This approach has the advantage of directly assessing the 
net impact of banking industry structure on local borrowers. 
In this paper, we follow the same market-based approach adopted by Alessandrini et al. 
(2009).  Following  Alessandrini  et  al.  (2009),  we  have  tried  to  overcome  the 
oversimplification of the morphological  structure’s measure of the local  banking industry 
provided in the literature by introducing a more accurate measure of the functional distance of 
local banking systems from local economies. Using a pooled sample of 2915 French SMEs, 
we find that both operational and functional distances play a significant role in explaining 
financing constraints to local firms. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main 
theoretical and empirical works related to our subject. Section 3 describes the data and the 
distance variables. Section 4 displays the dynamic investment econometric model performed 
and the different results obtained. The last section concludes.      
 
2.  Related Literature 
2.1. Distance and Lending Decisions: theory and evidence  
Economic theory recognize physical distance as causing potentially relevant economic costs 
for both the bank granting a credit and the firm seeking financing. These costs are not only 
pecuniary such as transportation costs, but also may be informational costs induced by the 
extra efforts required from the bank to access the creditworthiness of potential borrowers or to 
monitor  firm’s  investments.  The  review  of  the  theoretical  literature  on  spatial  pricing 
highlights  two  broad  channels  through  which  distance  affects  lending  decisions: 
transportation  costs  and  asymmetry  of  information.  Physical  closeness  to  the  potential 
borrower (and or to the local economy) allows the minimization of these costs by easing the 
process  of  soft  information’s  collection  that  is  relevant  for  small  business  lending.  This 
private information, added to hard data on borrowers, improves the quality of borrowers’ 
screening  and monitoring.  In this  way, the likelihood  of doing type  two errors  decreases 
(Gehrig  1998;  Zazzaro  2002)  as  well  as  the  probability  of  credit  rationing  equilibria 
(Williamson 1986).  
However,  great  operational  proximity  of  a  lending  bank  to  borrowers  may  negatively 
affect  financing  conditions.  First,  Market  imperfections  arise  because,  for  given  physical 
locations  of  borrower  and  lender,  distance  creates  an  imbalance  in  the  competitive 
environment  in  the  credit  market  if  we  consider  that  the  severity  of  the  asymmetric 
information problems intensifies with distances. In particular, banks that are close to firms 
gain an informational advantage over competitors thus they certify the quality of borrowers 
and therefore charge a certification premium over loan interest rates. Consequently, firms are 
informationally captured by the lending bank that can charge higher interest rates to such 
borrowers  (Sharpe  1990;  Hauswald  and  Marquez  2006).  It  is  called  the  “hold  up” 
phenomenon. Second, a “winner’s curse” type phenomenon is possible when the information 
on borrower’s quality is imperfectly shared by all banks. Banks in vicinity are considered as 
informed since they access easily and with low costs to firm’s information. The other banks 
are less informed and face increasing adverse selection problems when approaching locally 
captured firms. As a result, they would be conservative in terms of loan interest rates and 
acceptance standards (Broecker 1990; Shaffer 1998). Consequently, distances weakens the 
bank’s capability to extract rents from relationship borrower, at the same time as it aggravates 
adverse selection problems with respect to transaction borrowers. 
The  empirical  findings  seem  to  confirm  both  the  advantages  and  drawbacks  of 
geographical distance on loan conditions.  
At the bank level, Petersen and Rajan (2002) are the first to find evidence of spatial price 
discrimination in bank lending. Using the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF), they find that a borrower located in vicinity of the lender pays on average 126 points more than a borrower located 9 miles (the sample median) from the lender. However, 
the estimated coefficient might be potentially biased due to the omission of control variables 
including the proximity of potential competitors, the banking market concentration and the 
nature of the bank-firm relationship. Besides, Petersen and Rajan (2002) don’t examine the 
actual distance between the lending office and the firm but an estimated one calculated on the 
basis of firm’s transparency and creditworthiness. Because estimated distance increases with 
firm’s transparency, the findings suggest that banks engage spatial loan price discrimination 
and that higher quality firms (firms away from the banks) pay lower risk premium. Degryse 
and Ongena (2005), analyzing detailed contract  information from more than 15 000 large 
Belgian bank loans to small firms, provide first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of 
spatial loan pricing. Unlike Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005) control 
for some of the aforementioned control variables like the distance between the borrower and 
other  competing  banks,  as  well  as  measures  of  banking  competition.  They  find  that  the 
expected loan rate decrease by 14 basis points when the time travelling increase from zero to 
4 minutes (the sample median). A symmetric and qualitatively similar effect on loan price is 
obtained from an analogous increase in the distance to the closest competitor. Degryse and 
Ongena  (2005)  confirm  that  the  spatial  price  discrimination  is  essentially  caused  by 
transportation  costs  without  completely  remove  adverse  selection  as  an  alternative 
explanation. Agarwal and Hauswald (2006), using a dataset from a major U.S. bank, find 
results in line with the results in Degryse and Ongena (2005). They find that a borrower 
located in vicinity of the lender pays on average 195 points more than a borrower located 2.6 
miles (the sample median) from the lender. In addition, an increase in the distance to the 
closest competitor from zero to 0.55 miles (the sample median) raises the loan price by 55 
basis points. The statistical significance of these relations disappears when they control for the 
bank’s proprietary information (the bank’s internal credit score). Consequently, they conclude 
that  the  geographical  distance  is  a  simple  proxy  for  lender’s  informational  advantage, 
buttressing for models of price discrimination based on information asymmetries. Mistrulli 
and Casolaro (2008), using detailed information on more than 370000 bank loans granted to 
firms by more than 120 Italian banking institutions, find that the physical closeness of the 
borrower to the bank headquarters is associated with higher interest rates and that this effect is 
lower for large banks compared to small intermediaries. 
With regard to credit availability, it is rather easy, in a theoretical perspective, to explain 
why  banks  may  optimally  decline  credit  applications  from  small  businesses  that  are 
geographically remote (Hauswald and Marquez 2007; Carling and Lundberg 2005). In fact, 
information about small businesses is thought to be soft and has had to be collected by lenders 
over time through repeated interactions between loan officers or branch managers and firms 
(Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 1994). This implies that the lender has to have a 
local presence. However, empirical evidence on the existence of geographical credit rationing 
is mixed. In fact, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that remote applicants are more likely to be 
declined credits in the U.S. but this effect is strongly decreasing over time. Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2007) find that credit availability decrease with the bank-borrower distance and 
increase with the borrower-competitor distance. However, the statistical significance of these 
relations disappears when they control for the  bank’s proprietary information  (the bank’s 
internal credit score) concluding that the geographical distance is a simple proxy for lender’s informational advantage. However, Carling and Lundberg (2005), using data on corporate 
loans  granted  between  1994  and  2000  by  a  leading  Swedish  bank,  find  no  evidence  of 
geographical credit rationing. Uchida et al. (2008), using a unique Japanese data set and the 
same  methodology  as  Berger  et  al.  (2005)  obtained  no  evidence  of  geographical  credit 
rationing in Japan.   
At the market level, Avery and Samolyk (2000), using U.S. data, find that the number of 
banks  operating in  a Metropolitan Statistical  Area is  positively but  weakly related to  the 
growth rate of SME’s loans in the local market, whereas the number of offices has no impact 
at all on this growth rate. Using Italian data, Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001) find that the branch 
density (the ratio of branches to population) in a province is positively related to the volume 
of credit for small borrowers but it is negatively associated with the volume of bad loans. 
Benfratello et al. (2008), using a rich data set on innovation at the firm level for a large 
number of Italian firms over the 90’s, find that the banking development (computed as the 
number  of  branches  divided  by  population)  affects  positively  the  probability  of  process 
innovation, particularly for small firms and for firms in high(er) tech sectors and in sectors 
more dependent upon external finance. There is also some evidence that banking development 
reduces the cash flow sensitivity of fixed investment spending, particularly for small firms.  
2.2. Why Should the Geographical Distribution of Banks’ Decisional Centers affects Small 
Business Lending? Theory and evidence 
The process of financial integration in the European and US banking industry in the 1990s 
was  accompanied  by  the  debate  that  mostly  highlights  the  benefits  of  strengthened 
competition in credit markets, greater efficiency and the geographical reach of banking groups 
through affiliated banks and branches. This would have assured an adequate response to the 
need of local economies. However, the growing body of research examining the effects of 
bank consolidation and organizational structure on lending policies raises the question, for a 
long time neglected, of the cost of the predictable geographical concentration of decisional 
centres  and  the  increasing  size  and  complexity  of  bank  organisation  induced  by  the 
spectacular wave of bank mergers and acquisitions. Put differently, this body of research 
highlights the fact that the organizational complexity of the institutions to which the loan 
office belongs is as much important as the operational proximity in the process of credit 
allocation to small businesses. 
Theoretical arguments suggest that small banks might be more able to deliver relationship 
lending because their simple organizational structure does not require the transmission of soft 
information  necessary  for the SME lending decision process  (Stein  2002). Thus, banking 
consolidation  may  be  detrimental  for  small  businesses  if  the  great  complexity  of  banks 
organizational  structure  leads  to  a  substitution  of  transaction  lending  based  on  hard 
information for relationship lending based of soft information, which is no good for opaque 
SMEs. 
In small business lending, the bank bases its credit decisions largely on private or soft 
information about the firm and its owner that is collected through multiple interactions over 
time and across products (Boot 2000; Berger and Udell 2002). The bank invests in obtaining 
firm-specific  information,  which  is  often  propriety  in  nature.  Consequently,  “soft” information may confer the bank with a competitive informational advantage over banks that 
base  their  decision  on  public  information  and  thus  obtain  a  less  precise  signal  of  the 
creditworthiness of the firm. However, the collection method of this information needs to be 
personal, making soft information hardly verifiable and thus difficult to transmit to upper 
echelons of banking organization and to store. For a complex bank organizational structure, 
characterized by branches operating in areas distant from their headquarters, many critical 
issues may deter it from engaging in intensive soft information activities, i.e. small business 
lending. 
 
The risk of an imperfect strategic communication between the principal – the senior 
manager and the agent – the local officer 
The  seminal  paper  by  Crawford  and  Sobel  (1982)  shows  that  the  person  who  sends 
information  (here  the  local  officer)  may  deliberately  manipulate  this  information  if  his 
preference is not perfectly aligned with that of the recipient of this information (here the 
senior manager). In fact, bank’s local officers are expected to compete for limited internal 
resources and to carry out specific investments (Ozbas 2005). They derive a greater benefit 
from larger budgets, prompting them to exaggerate their estimates of profitability in order to 
increase their likelihood of obtaining more resources. This is particularly possible since soft 
information on business activities is concentrated in the hands of local bank officers. Taking 
advantage of asymmetric information’s problems within the bank, local bank officers may 
manipulate this information inducing noisy communications (Dessein 2002; Harris and Raviv 
2005).  Consequently,  the  inexistence  of  specific  channels  to  communicate  this  soft 
information within a bank requires costly internal organizational adjustments. 
 
The control costs induced by the decentralization of lending decisions 
Stein  (2002),  who  investigates  how  the  organizational  structure  of  a  bank  affects  the 
incentives of loan officers to produce and use different types of information, suggests that 
local loan officers in hierarchically complex organizations will have less ex-ante incentives to 
collect and use information, particularly the soft one. This is because they do not generally 
have decision-making authority and must transfer the information to the upper echelons of the 
banking  organization  (see  also  Aghion  and  Tirole  1997).  Given  the  soft  nature  of  this 
information, it is more likely to be neglected and not integrated into the decision process. 
Anticipating this behaviour may reduce the incentive to make efforts to collect it. Of course, 
one can argue that a loan officer is actually obliged to fill a report when he evaluates several 
attributes of an applicant (e.g. honesty and managerial competence). It is what we call the 
“hardening” of soft information that eases its process of transmission to upwards (Petersen 
2004). The model in Stein (2002) suggests that in this case banks with simple organizations 
may still have an efficiency advantage in providing relationship financing than more complex 
banks, since the incentives problems turns into a bureaucracy problem.  
However, when the activity of production and information processing is delegated to local 
loan officers, they are granted considerable authority, particularly because of the ability to 
manipulate  soft  information.  The  decentralization  of  decision-making  involves  the 
development of control mechanisms. Giving the role of local loan officer in the information’s collection and process, one control mechanism proposed in the literature consists on trying to 
modify his utility by applying optimal combinations of salary and budget allocation. 
 
Consequently, the optimal organizational structure minimizes communication costs and 
expected information losses that result from both horizontal and vertical communication of 
subjective information. 
The severity of communication and incentive problems as well as their negative impact on 
lending  policies  and  credit  allocation  grows  with  distance  between  hierarchical  levels. 
Functional distance condenses physical and economic attributes. Firstly, it is reasonable to 
believe that the greater the physical distance between the bank’s headquarter and the local 
branch, the more difficult it is for the senior manager to gather reliable information from the 
local officer, monitor his actions and efficiently centralize credit decision making. Secondly, 
an  important  part  of  the  information  about  the  economic  structure  of  the  local  market 
information  is  recoverable  only  by  local  loan  officers  with  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
particular economic environment within which they operate. They may accumulate a unique 
informational capital on which strictly depends the capacity of selecting good projects but that 
is non codified and therefore impossible to transmit to the top management. Thus, the greater 
the gap between the economic structures of the parent bank and local branch locations, the 
greater  the  informational  asymmetry  within  the  bank.  In  this  case,  agency  problems  are 
particularly acute.  
There are indirect empirical evidences  of the existence of agency and communication 
costs related to the distance between bank hierarchical levels. First, number of studies show 
that mergers and acquisitions between large or out-of-state banks generate a reduction in SME 
lending however those involving small or in-state banks impact, in the long run, positively 
small business lending (Keeton 1996; Berger et al. 1998; Cole and Walraven 1998; Peek and 
Rosengren  1998;  Sapienza  2002;  Alessandrini  et  al.  2008)  .Second  ,  some  other  studies 
provided evidence that large out-of-market owned and foreign banks allocate fewer resources 
to small business lending than other banks because they have a real competitive disadvantage 
in  evaluating  their  creditworthiness  (Keeton  1995;  Cole  et  al.  2004 ;  Carter  et  al.  2004; 
Alessandrini  et  al.  (2005) ;  Berger  et  al.  2005 ;  Carter  and  McNulty  2005 ;  Mian  2006). 
Consisting  with  incentive  problems  characterizing  geographically  dispersed  banks,  Ferri 
(1997) found that large national banks tend to significantly limit the average time spent by a 
loan officer in a specific branch in order to restrain agency costs due to its informational rent.  
The implications arising from the trade-off between delegation and control have been 
deeply  analysed  in  the  principal-agent  theory.  Liberti  (2004)  found  empirical  evidence 
consistent with the idea that empowering local loan officers increases the effort they devote to 
evaluate and monitor the creditworthiness of borrowers, and improves the performance of the 
bank. However, Liberti does not control for monitoring costs that the parent bank spends on 
controlling loan officers and the performance of their loan portfolios (Udell 1989; Berger and 
Udell  2002).  These  monitoring  costs  seem  to  have  strong  positive  correlation  with  the 
organisational complexity of the bank and the degree of autonomy of local managers. 
A  more  direct  indication  of  the  importance  of  distance-related  bank  communication 
frictions is given by Liberti and Mian (2009) that analyse a large multinational bank operating 
in Argentina. They find that the sensitivity of the amount of credit facility to soft information is lower for credit lines approved at a distance hierarchical level, whereas the opposite is true 
for the sensitivity of the amount of credit facility to hard information.  
At the market level, with regard to the Italian economy, Bonaccorsia and Dell’Ariccia 
(2004) find that the creation of industrial firms in a giving province is positively associated 
with the share of deposits held by banks headquartered in the same province (a measure of 
functional distance). Collender and Shaffer (2003), studying the impact of functional distance 
on  local  economic  growth,  find  that  the  impact  of  the  number  of  bank  offices  operating 
locally on local economic growth differs significantly with the locus of their ownership.   
     
3.  Data and variables 
3.1. Data 
To test the effects of spatial diffusion-concentration on SME lending, we build up a panel 
dataset  containing information  on firms,  bank branches,  head office locations,  and macro 
variables in France at the departmental level. The time period considered is 2001 – 2008. 
The database relies on four main sources:  
-  SME specific information drawn from DIANE
2: we consider French manufacturing 
enterprises from which we exclude those who are subsidiaries of groups because of 
their financial dependence of the group.  
-  The geographical distribution at the departmental level of all bank branches drawn 
from the Bank of France. 
-  The composition of Banking groups and the location of bank head offices drawn from 
banks annual reports. 
-  Macroeconomic  data  at  the  departmental  level  of  population  is  from  the  National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). 
After cleaning, the full sample contains 2915 French SMEs. Table 1 defines the variables 
employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, median, standard deviation 
and sources. 
 
3.2. Measuring distances 
3.2.1. The local banking system operational proximity 
The notion of operational distance is the one usually examined in the banking literature and 
corresponds to the physical distance which separates the borrower from each lending office. It 
is conceivable to assume that the number of bank branches in a giving geographical area (here 
the  department)  is  typically  positively  related  to  the  operational  proximity  (  )  of  the 
banking  system  to  this  area.  One  measure,  drawn  from  the  literature,  of  the  operational 
proximity  of  the  banking  system  from  the  department     is  the  branch  density  in  this 
department: 
     
                
  
   
           
        
Where    is the number of banks operating in the department d . 3.2.2. The local banking system functional distance 
Functional proximity is usually measured as the proportion of local credit market (in terms of 
branches or deposits) controlled by banks that concentrate their activities in a delimited area. 
This  measure  implicitly  assumes  that  functional  distance  is  a  dichotomous  character  that 
concerns  only  some,  usually  small,  mutual  and  cooperative,  banks  and  not  the  others. 
According to Alessandrini et al. (2009), functional distance is “a character shared to some 
extent by all banks that, given the localism of their decisional centres and strategic functions, 
are necessarily close to some areas and far from others”. To this respect, while a department 
with banking system formed by only local credit banks has the lowest value of functional 
distance  indicators;  it  is  also  true  that  two  departments  with  equally  functionally  distant 
banking systems may show very different proportion of local banks. 
We  adopt  the  measure  of  functional  distance  at  the  departmental  level  advanced  by 
Alessandrini et al. (2009). We compute the functional distance of the local banking system 
from  department  d  by  weighting  the  proportion  of  each  bank  branches  operating  in  the 
province  d  by  the  physical  distance  indicator  that  captures  the  severity  of  information 
asymmetries between the senior manager at the parent bank and the bank officer at the local 
branch. Organizational  frictions induced by these information  asymmetries are considered 
positively correlated to the physical distance between the bank’s headquarter and the local 
lending office. 
The functional distance indicator is: 
            
              
                
  
   
                              
  
   
          
The physical distance is the kilometric orthodromic
3 distance between the local capital town 
(also called a prefecture) of the department  d in which the branch is located and the local 
capital  town  of  the  department  h  where  the  head  office  of  the  own  (parent)  bank  is 
headquartered. 
3.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Figures 3 and 4 show an increase (on average) of both operational proximity and functional 
distance  of  the  banking  system  to  French  departments.  Whereas,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
functional distance has increased at higher pace than operational proximity showing that the 
trend toward the internal grouping of mutual networks is stronger than the recent process of 
banking supply system reinforcement. The regional distribution of distance indicators in 2008 
shows that the banking system is operationally more proximate to the East, West, and Center 
than to the North and South (See Figure 3 (b)). It is functionally more distant to the East, 
Center, North, and South than to the West (See Figure 4 (b)). However, it is interesting to 
mention that the 2001 – 2008 regional operational proximity growth rate is the highest in the 
North and in the South, and that the functional distance growth rate is the highest in the West, 
Center and East (See Figure 3 and 4).  3.3. Measuring credit constraints 
We say that a firm is credit constrained when: 
-  It is credit rationed à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this case, the firm apply for a 
loan to a bank or financial intermediary and have the application partially or totally rejected 
even if it is willing to pay a higher interest rate (or collateral) to obtain the credit. 
-  It faces credit difficulties in terms of high interest rates and/or collateral guarantees 
which enable it to accept the credit proposed. 
The  elusiveness  of  this  notion  makes  it  hard  to  measure.  In  fact,  what  we  generally 
observe in the firms balance-sheets is the quantity of loan made, not the amount requested and 
the amount granted. Therefore, many proxy variables where proposed in the literature. 
The proxy of financing constraints used in this paper is drawn from the large strand of 
literature which investigates the sensitivity of firm’s investment to the cash flow
4 (Fazzari et 
al. 1988; Kaplan and Zingales 1997). Fazzari et al. (1988) classify firms according to whether 
they were likely to be financially constrained on the basis of their size, dividend payouts and 
capital  structure.  These  characteristics  determine  whether  they  are  more  sensitive  to  the 
supply of internal funds measured by cash flow. The highest sensitivities to cash flow are 
found for firms classified as financially constrained. Many further studies have followed the 
same methodology including Chirinko and Schaller (1995), Hubbard et al. (1995), Calomaris 
and Hubbard (1995), as summarized by Hubbard (1998). 
A more recent literature has raised criticisms about the use of cash flow sensitivity as a 
reliable  measure  of  financing  constraints.  Kaplan  and  Zingales  (1997)  and  Kaplan  and 
Zingales (2000) have argued that the classification adopted by Fazzari et al. (1988) tends to 
assign firms incorrectly. They make use of more detailed information in financial statements 
from  annual  reports  to  categorize  the  same  firms  over  an  identical  sample  period  into 
“financially  constrained”,  “possibly  financially  constrained”  and  “not  financially 
constrained”. Using this new classification, they find that financially constrained firms have 
the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Clearly (1999), using a larger dataset, also 
finds that the most constrained firms have the lowest sensitivity. Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2004)  show  that  the  results  of  Kaplan  and  Zingales(1997)  can  be  explained  by  a  few 
influential  observations  however  the  findings  of  Clearly  (1999)  can  be  explained  by 
observations of firms with negative cash flows. The main message underlying Kaplan and 
Zingales as well as Clearly works is that firms under distress might suffer from law cash flow 
sensitivity, so that for severely constrained firms the usual relationship found in the literature 
might be reversed. What we think is that the use of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a 
measure of financing constraints should not be critical if cash flow weakly (or don’t) forecast 




Table 1: Data description 
Variables  Definition  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Source 
Dependent variable           
(I/K) 
The firm-level ratio of investment to previous 
capital stock. Investment is measured as the 
variation between t and t-1 of the firm's capital 
stock (defined as tangible and intangible assets, 
gross of depreciation allowances) 
.0605  .0302  .190 
Author's calculation on 
Balance Sheet data in 
DIANE (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Explanatory 
variables         
 
FDKM 
The departmental indicator of the organizational 
structure of the local banking system. It is 
measured by the functional distance of the local 
banking system from the local borrowers, 
computed as the ratio of bank    branches to total 
branches in department   weighted by the 
logarithm of 1 plus the orthodromic distance 
between the department of the branch and the 
department where the parent bank is 
headquartered. 
3.423  3.290  1.123 
Author's calculation on Bank 
of France data and Banks 
annual reports 
OP 
The departmental indicator of the local banking 
system operational proximity to a department  . It 
is a measure of the branch density in this 
department, computed as the number of bank 
branches in department   per 10000 inhabitants.  
4.296  4.279  .807  Author's calculation on Bank 
of France and INSEE data 
(CF/K) 
The firm-level ratio of cash flow to previous 
capital stock. It is computed as net profit plus 
depreciation allowances. 
.137  .0927  .449 
Author's calculation on 
Balance Sheet data in 
DIANE (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Growth  The firm’s annual growth rate of total sales.  .048  .029  .217 
Author's calculation on 
Balance Sheet data in 




Size 1  is 1 if [11 - 20] employees, in %  16.26  0  36.90  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
Size 2  is 1 if [21 - 50] employees, in %  36.95  0  48.27  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
Size 3  is 1 if [51 - 250] employees, in %  36.69  0  48.19  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
Size 4  is 1 if [251 - 500] employees, in %  7.24  0  25.92  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
tech1 
is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a low technology 
manufacturing sector (NAF rév2 code = 10 - 11 - 
12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 24 - 31), in % 
31.43  0  46.42  Firm data in DIANE and 
SESSI Classification 
tech2 
is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a medium-low 
technology manufacturing sector (NAF rév2 code 
=  22 - 23 - 25 - 28 - 30.1 - 30.2 - 30.9 - 32 - 33), 
in % 
49.23  0  49.99  Firm data in DIANE and 
SESSI Classification 
tech3 
is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a medium-high 
technology manufacturing sector (Code Naf rév2 =  
20 - 26.5 - 26.6 - 26.7 - 26.8 - 27.1 - 27.2 - 27.3 - 
27.4 - 27.9 - 29.1 - 29.2 - 29.3), in % 
12.48  0  33.06  Firm data in DIANE and 
SESSI Classification 
tech4 
is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a high technology 
manufacturing sector (Code Naf rév2= 21 - 26.1 - 
26.2 - 26.3 - 26.4 - 30.3 - 30.4), in % 
3.5  0  18.37  Firm data in DIANE and 
SESSI Classification 
North  is 1 if the firm is located in the North of France 
(Insee region codes: 11 - 21 - 22 - 31), in %  29.67  0  45.68  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
West  is 1 if the firm is located in the West (Insee region 
codes: 23 - 25 - 52 - 53), in %  15.4  0  36.09  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
Center 
is 1 if the firm is located in the Center (Insee 
region codes: 24 - 74 - 83 and Insee department 
codes: 86 - 79), in % 
9.29  0  29.03  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
East  is 1 if the firm is located in the East (Insee region 
codes: 26 - 41 - 42 - 43 - 82), in %  27.58  0  44.69  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 




region codes: 72 – 73 and Insee department codes: 
16-17), in % 
Van Dijk) 
South East  is 1 if the firm s located in the South East (Insee 
region codes: 91 - 93), in %  5.83  0  23.43  Firm data in DIANE (Bureau 
Van Dijk) 
tdum  temporel dummies for the period 2001 - 2008  12.5  0 
 
33.07 




Figure 3 Panel (a) plots the number of branches per 10000 inhabitants over the period 2001-
2008 in North, West, Center, East and South regions. Panel (b) shows branch density in 2008 






Figure 4  Panel (a) plot the evolution of functional distance calculated weighting branches by 
kilometers over the period 2001 – 2008, in North, West, Center, East and South  regions. 
Panel (b) shows functional distance in 2008 in the 96 French departments, classified in 






















4. The Investment-cash flow sensitivity econometric model and results 
 
4.1. Dynamic investment model 
We test the effects of operational proximity and functional distance on the sensitiveness of 
firm  investment  to  cash  flow  by  estimating  a  dynamic  panel  investment  model.  The 
autoregressive investment model of order 1 is: 
 
  
    
 
  
          
    
    
 
  
      
   
    
 
  
      
   
    
 
  
            
   
    
 
  
          
                                                                    
       is the growth rate of sales which is a proxy of firm’s profitability.    and    are 
individual  and  time  specific  effects  and              


















intensity industry classification dummies are included in the basic specification of equation 
(1) to control for fixed effects. 
       Financially constrained firms are more likely to exhibit a positive correlation between 
cash flow and investment. Therefore, the marginal effect of cash flow on investment may be 
used as a proxy for financing constraints.  
       Giving that the aim is to estimate the indirect effect of distance on investment, we include 
two interaction terms between cash flow and operational proximity and functional distance 
respectively ( 
   
    
           
   
    
          .  
       According to the specification (1), the measure of the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow is: 
   
  
    
   
                                                     
       The impact of operational and functional distances on financing constraints depends on 
the signs taken by       and     . 
Giving that smaller firms are more likely to be rationed than greater ones, it is interesting 
to examine whether: 
  the marginal effect of cash flow on investment is higher for small firms; 
  the  operational  and  functional  distances  affect  differently  small  and  large  firm’s 
investment sensitivities to cash flows. 
To do this, we perform two other specifications by adding two interaction terms between 
firm size and    
   
    
       and  
   
    
          respectively. 
4.2. Estimation methodology 
The dynamic structure of the model by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable makes 
usual  estimators  of  fixed  effect  panel  data  biased  and  inconsistent.  By  construction,  the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error component renders the OLS 
estimator  biased  and  inconsistent  even  if  the       are  not  serially  correlated  (Sevestre  and 
Trognon (1985)). For the fixed effects (FE) estimator, the Within transformation wipes out the 
fixed  effects  but  the  correlation  still  persists  between  the  transformed  lagged  dependent 
variable and errors, even if the     are not serially correlated. It is well noting that only if 
      will the Within estimator of     be consistent for the dynamic error component model, 
which is not the case. 
An alternative to the Within estimator consists on applying OLS to the model written in 
first differences. In this case, correlation between the predetermined explanatory variables and 




estimator,  the  FD  estimator  is  biased  and  inconsistent  even  when  N  and  T  both  tend  to 
infinity. 
The  instrumental  variable  (IV)  estimation  methods  (Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1981))  are 
known to have better performances than these usual methods. They lead to consistent but not 
necessarily  efficient  estimates  of  the  parameters  in  the  model  because  it  suffers  from  a 
significant  loss  of  degrees  of  freedom,  and  it  does  not  take  into  account  the  differenced 
structure on the residual disturbances. 
For all these reasons, we decided to use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and, 
in particular, the system-GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998) that is known to be more efficient 
than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator. The Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM method 
is based on the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with 
lagged first differences as instruments ) and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as 
instruments). 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Functional distance and SME financing constraints 
Table 3 displays the estimation results of the basic and augmented specifications. On the 
whole, the results on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow are consistent with those on 
credit  constraints  described  in  the  section  2.  Investment  of  firms  in  departments  with  a 
functionally  more  distant  banking  system  is  more  sensitive  to  cash  flow,  and  this  effect 
decreases with size. 
The positive coefficient on the interaction term  
   
    
          shows that the marginal 
effect of cash flows on investment is increasing with       . In fact, we are always unable 
to reject the null hypothesis         It is worth noting that even if the coefficient on cash flow 
is  negative,  the  overall  estimated  marginal  effect  (2)  is  positive.  In  fact,  using  estimated 
coefficients from regression (2) and average values of the different variables including   , 
we could calculate the value of       beyond which the marginal effect of cash flow on 
investment  become  positive.  This  value  is  below  the  fifth  percentile,  showing  that  the 
marginal effect is positive in almost 95% of cases. These findings confirm the idea that the 
severity of communication and incentive problems as well as their negative impact of lending 
policies  and  credit  allocation  grows  with  the  distance  between  bank’s  hierarchical  levels 
(Alessandrini et al. 2009) 
The results of the first augmented specification point out significant differences in the 
impact of functional distance on investment-cash flow sensitivity according to firm size. From 
column  (3),  we  can  observe  that  the  larger  is  the  SME,  the  lower  is  the  contribution  of 
      to the marginal effect of cash flow on investment. This relation seems to be linear and 
is significant for SIZE 3 and SIZE 4 SMEs’ groups. These findings are broadly consistent with 
the theoretical prediction by which larger firms suffer less from the lack of banks’ decisional 






4.3.2. Operational proximity and SME financing constraints 
Interestingly, Table 3 shows that operational proximity has qualitatively the same significant 
adverse effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity as functional distance which confirms the 
informational  capture  that  an  operationally  close  banking  system  may  exercise  on  local 
borrowers  as  well  as  adverse  selection  problems  arising  when  approaching  these  locally 
captured firms (Hauswald and Marquez 2006). 
The  impact  of  operational  proximity  on  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  also  differs 
according to firm size. From column (4), we can observe that the larger is the SME (the 
largest group of SME considered), the lower is the adverse impact of operational distance on 
financing constraints. This confirms the theoretical prediction by which small firms suffer 
more from hold up problems than larger firms because of their opacity.   
The consistencies of these results are confirmed by the validation of the instrument set at 
5% and the reject of serial correlation in the original error, as desired.  The dummies are 
generally not significant, expect for dummies relatives to 2001 and 2002 years that shows 
positive and significant coefficients, expect for industry dummies which shows significantly 
higher investment capabilities for low and medium technological sectors. 
Table 3 The effect of distances on investment cash flow sensitivity. This table shows the one 
step System-GMM estimation of equation (1) using Stata 10.1 SE package. Time, geographic 
and technological intensity industry classification dummies are included in all regressions, not 
shown for reasons of space. As instruments, we use lags of endogenous and pre-determined 
variables  from  t-1  to  t-2.  A  first  specification  test  is  the  Arellano-Bond  test  for  zero 
autocorrelation tests of first, second and third orders AR (1), AR (2) and AR (3). A second 
specification test is the Sargan test of Over-Indentifying Restrictions (OIR Sargan test). P-
values are reported for all these tests.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  (I/K)  (I/K)  (I/K)  (I/K) 












  (0.00764)  (0.00764)  (0.00764)  (0.00764) 
(Growth)-1  0.00229  0.00234  0.00267  0.00272 






  (0.00370)  (0.0264)  (0.0264)  (0.0264) 




    (0.00361)  (0.00414)  (0.00362) 










     
0.000253 
 
      (0.00275)   
(CF/K)*FDKM*SIZE3      -0.00629
b   
      (0.00302)   
(CF/K)*FDKM*SIZE4      -0.0293
a   
      (0.00556)   
(CF/K)*OP*SIZE2        -0.000156 
        (0.00215) 
(CF/K)*OP*SIZE3        -0.00384
c 
        (0.00231) 
(CF/K)*OP*SIZE4        -0.0214
a 
        (0.00410) 




b  -0.623 
  (0.393)  (0.393)  (0.393)  (0.475) 
         
Observations  20404  20404  20404  20404 
Number of firms 


























a Statistical significance at the 1% level 
b Statistical significance at the 5% level 
c Statistical significance at the 10% level  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have tried to assess the impact of geographical diffusion of banking 
structures and instruments as well as geographical concentration of decisional and strategic 
centres of banking institutions over the period 2001 – 2008 on firms’ financing constraints. 
Our econometric exercise consistently show that increased functional distance made financing 
constraints more binding, reflected by the positive coefficient relying it with the investment 
cash-flow sensitivity. These negative effects are particularly evident for small firms ([11 – 50] 
workers). Interestingly, operational proximity has qualitatively the same significant adverse 
effect  on  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  as  functional  distance  which  confirms  the 
informational  capture  that  an  operationally  close  banking  system  may  exercise  on  local 
borrowers  as  well  as  adverse  selection  problems  arising  when  approaching  these  locally 
captured firms (Hauswald and Marquez 2006).  
One implication of our findings is that the consolidation of the French banking industry, 
leading to an increase of the functional distance may aggravate financing problems of small 
local firms, especially in peripheral departments. As Alessandrini et al. (2009) and before 
Berger and Udell (2006) have pointed out, these negative externalities of market deregulation 




economies of scale by standardized, arm’s-length lending technologies, to economies of scope 
by making specialized credit instruments available to local firms”. 
Finally, our results are particularly suggestive of the persistent importance of relationship 
lending  for  small  opaque  borrowers  despite  the  technological  progress  that  significantly 
expands the ability of banks to produce hard information and therefore substitute transactions-
based  lending  for  relationship  lending  and  basel  II  recommendations  that  push  banks  to 
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Appendix 1
Figure 1 (a) The French banking sector consolidation. (b) The emblematic internal grouping 
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Figure2 Branches, ATMs and employees evolution in the French banking system, 1999 – 











































































































































































Figure 2 French SMEs Investments’ financing plan, 2004 – 2009. Source: the OSEO biannual 





Table 4 Geographic and Size distribution of the SME sample 
 
Geographic 







North  1072  2479  2448  609  6608 
West  389  1167  1608  310  3474 
Center  359  802  846  108  2115 
East  1006  2431  2401  470  6308 
South-West  532  1172  999  123  2826 
 South-East  436  567  255  69  1327 
France  3794  8618  8557  1689  22658 
 
Table 5 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  (I/K)  (CF/K)  FD KM  OP  Growth 
(I/K)  1             
(CF/K)  0.0656***  1       
FD KM  -0.0003  0.0324***  1     
OP  0.0109*  0.0045  0.2060***  1   
Growth  0.1986***  0.0711***  0.0028  0.0007  1 
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